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BLACK & MOORE
500 Ten West Broadway Building
salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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363-2727

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CAROL STARR, Mother of
RONALD DEAN BRODERICK,
deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No:

16378

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, PEPSI COLA BOTTLING
COMPANY and STATE INSURANCE
FUND,

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE INSURANCE FUND

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the final order of the Industrial
Commission of Utah denying the appellant compensation benefits for
the death of her son on the basis of the Commission's finding
that she was not a dependent of her son within the meaning of
the Workmen's Compensation Act.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
A hearing was held in this matter before Administrative
Law Judge Keith E.

Sohm who found that the applicant was not

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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a dependent of the decedent as defined by the Workmen's
Compensation Act.

The Industrial Commission thereafter order,.

the respondent insurance carrier to pay the sum of $15, 600 to
the Special Fund pursuant to Section 35-1-68 Utah Code Annota:;
which provides that in the case of an industrial injury causir.:
death where the deceased has no dependents
be paid to the Special Fund.

benefits are to

The defendant was also ordered

to pay burial expenses for the deceased in the statutory amoum
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent respectfully requests the Court to affirn
the order of the Industrial Commission.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ronald Dean Broderick, the decedent, was employed as a
driver by the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company and died on June 25,
1978 as a result of injuries be sustained in a collision
which occurred in the course of his employment.
At the time of his death, the decedent was 22' years old,
unmarried and living at home with his mother, stepfather,
five brothers and sisters and two stepbrothers and sisters.
(R. 16).

He earned approximately $1000 a month (R. 23) of

which he contributed to his mother, according to her testimon·
$100 a month in cash for his own room and board.

The appellrl

employed at the time earning $6,4444 a year (R. 19) and her
husband was employed earning $11,500 a year.

(R.

21)

One

of the appellant's other sons was employed earning minimum
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wages which he spent for his own school clothes and needs
(R.

24).

The decedent had given his mother $200 to buy a microwave oven shortly before his death which the appellant testified
she would have been able to purchase anyway

(R. 18-19).

she also testified that she thought she and her husband could
have purchased things, bought food and done things on the
same basis without the money contributed by her son.

(R.

19)

She stated that she was not so much dependent on the money
her son contributed as she was dependent on him personally.
(R.

22)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPENDENT ON THE DECEASED FOR
FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR
HIS DEATH.
By her own testimony, the appellant was not a dependent of
the decedent within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation
Act.

Section 35-1-71 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended 1977
provides that minor children and surviving spouses are presumed
to be dependents of a deceased worker.

The statute further

provides that
In all other cases, the question
of dependency in whole or in part,
shall be determined in accordance
with the facts in each particular
case existing at the time of injury
or death.
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This Court frequently has considered the question of
dependency in claims which are not subject to the statutory
presumption.

Recently, the Court reitterated the legal test

which has consistently been applied in cases such as this one.
In Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, 534 P.2d 897
(Utah 1975), a case in which a father claimed dependency on
his son, Justice Maughan quoted the rule as stated by the Court
in Rigby v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 454, 458, 286
P. 628 (1930)
To entitle plaintiff to compensation in this case,
it must affirmatively be made to appear that at
the time of the injury (1) plaintiff relied upon
his son, in whole or in part, for his support and
maintenance;
(2) that had the son not been killed
plaintiff would in all probability have received
some assistance from his son:
(3) that it was
reasonably necessary for the son to render his
father some financial aid in order that the father
might continue to live in a condition suitable
and becoming to his station in life.
The Court in Farnsworth summarized the relevant principle
by observing that dependency within the terms of the statute
means
that the applicant looked to and relied on the
contributions of the workman, in whole or in part,
as a means of supporting and maintaining himself
in accordance with his social position and
accustomed mode of life.
The appellant's testimony before the Commission establisr.:
the validity of the Commission's finding that she was not
dependent upon her son for support. She admits that his
contributions were made for his own room and board, that she
could have maintained the same standard of living without hi 5
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contributions, and that her real dependency on her son was
for emotional support.
The appellant gave the following testimony in response to
questioning from her counsel.

Q

And were any funds being paid by
your son to you?

A

He paid a hundred dollars a month
that was for his room and board.

It is well established that payments made by a decedent
for his own living expenses are not contributions to his
family's support.

In Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 67

Utah 25, 245 P. 381, 386 (1926) a mother applied for benefits
as a dependent of a deceased son who lived at home on the basis
of contributions made by him to the family.

This Court ruled

that the cost of the decedent's own support should be deducted
from the amount he regularly tendered his mother to determine
the contribution from which dependency could be established.
"The commission should have carefully considered
the cost of maintaining the deceased son in connection
with the cost of maintaining the whole family, and
should also have considered to what extent he
assisted his mother in maintaining the household
and the pecuniary benefits, * * * and should
have determined the monetary value of all the
foregoing elements, and, after doing that, it
should have deducted the actual cost of maintenance therefrom, and the difference remaining,
if any, should have been taken as the basis for
fixing the amount of the award."
This is the general rule as reported by Professor Larsen in
Larsen Workmen's Compensation Law §63.12, p. 11-68 and §63.22,
p. ll-82.
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. . . it has frequently been held that,
if the decedent's contribution is offset by
the value of board and room received, he is
doing no more than to 'pull his own weight';
he is merely supporting himself, with nothing
left over to represent support of dependents.
. . . the key fact is that the same event which
deprives the claimant parent of a source of
income also removes a source of expense.
In the instant case no evidence was received about the
value of the decedent's board and room.

However, the applicar.:

herself testified that the payment by the decedent of $100 a
month was "for his room and board."

Undoubtedly the decedent'.

room and board could be valued at $100 a month, if not more,
The Court has noted that where the Commission makes no
findings about the cost of the decedent's maintenance, this
Court may do so by inference from the record.

Utah Fuel Co.

v. Industrial Commission, supra; Park Utah Consol. Mines co.
v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 81, 36 P.2d 979 (1934).
Such an evaluation in this instance compels the conclusion

thrl

decedent's $100 monthly contribution is offset in whole or in
substantial part by the value of his own room and board.
This view of the nature of the· decedent's contributions ..
corroborated by the appellant's testimony in response to
questioning about the focal issue of her claim.
Q

This particular money that you received from
your son, if you were not to receive it, if
he hadn't given you this hundred dollars a
month plus the extras, would you have been
able to live an [sic] purchase things and
buy food and do things on the same basis
without that money?

A

Yes. It would have been harder but I
think we could have.
(R. 19)
-6-
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Earlier, the appellant stated that her son had purchased
their family a microwave oven before he died.

On that subject

she testified as follows:
A

. . two weeks before he died he gave
me his two hundred dollars out of his
last paycheck.

Q

What did he give you that for?

A

To buy me a stove.

Q

Would you have been able to buy this stove
if he hadn't given you the $200?

A

Yes, but we just hadn't done it.

(R. 18)

The appellant testified that she and her husband would aave
been able to purchase things, buy food and do things on the
same basis without the room and board money they received from
her son.

She testified that even luxury items like a microwave

oven could have been acquired as easily without the occasional
gifts she received from her son.

She has, in effect, directly

admitted that her son's contributions were not necessary for
her own support and that her family could have lived in the
style to which they were accustomed without his contributions.
In view of the fact the appellant and her husband had a
combined income of nearly $19,000 at the time of the accident it
is not surprising that she would admit that her sons payments
were not needed to maintain them in their usual style of life.

In Hancock v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 192, 198 P.169
(1921) this Court ruled that contributions by a deceased son
to his parents which averaged $25.00 a month did not establish
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dependency in whole or in part because his father's

inco~e

of $100 a month was sufficient for his family's usual style
life.
By her own admission, the appellant cannot satisfy the;,
criteria of dependency in fact.
In truth, the appellant's dependency on her son was

of

another variety, one which undoubtedly made his loss the more
profound but one for which the law of Workmen's Compensation
affords no remedy.

•

Q

Carol, looking back in this situation and
prior to the time that your son was in this
accident, did you feel that you were somewhat
dependent upon the money that came to
the household from him?

A

Not so much the money as I was on him.
When his father was killed, Ron was 11 years
old so we were dependent on each other. He
was always there when I needed him.

The case of Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, supra,
closely resembles the case at bar in this regard.

The applk·

was blind and relied on his 19 year old son for support and
services such as reading him his mail, driving him to medical
appointments and on other errands, and performing yard work
and chores around the house.

In ruling that contributions

o:.

this sort did not create a dependency which is compensable
under the Act, the Court concluded
In the instant action, the assistance
rendered by decedent to his father was not
comparable to financial assistance to maintain
him in his accustomed station in life. It was
greater, it was the love, affection, and companior·
ship of a dutiful child; and deserving of the
highest comendation.
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Such assistance, as is here shown, commendable
as it is, does not establish dependency within the
Workmen's Compensation Act, the purpose of which
is to provide compensation for the probable
financial loss suffered by dependents on account
of the death of the decedent.
The Commission did not err in finding that the appellant
was not a dependent of her deceased son, substantial evidence
supports their conclusion and there is no basis in the record
for reversing the order entered.
POINT II
THE DENIAL OF BENEFITS TO THE APPELLANT IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE PURPOSE OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AND THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The appellant contends that since the Workmen's Compensation
Act was enacted to benefit workers and their families the denial
of benefits to the appellant and the award of benefits to the
Special Fund pursuant to Section 35-1-68 Utah Code Annotated
was contrary to the purpose of the Act.

She also contends that

since Article XVI Section 5 of the Constitution of Utah provides
that the right to an action for wrongful death shall not be
abrogated except where compensation is provided for by law, she
is guaranteed the right to compensation for her son's death or
a right of action against his employer for wrongful death.

Both

contentions are completely without merit.
The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act in providing
benefits in cases of death was reviewed by this Court in
the case of Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, supra, discussed
earlier.

As noted, Justice Maughan stated that the purpose

of the Act
is to provide compensation for the probable
financial loss sufferred by dependents on
account of the death of the decedent.
(Emphasis Added)
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Farnsworth, supra, 534 P.2d at 900.

The authority cited by

the appellant in her discussion about the original intent of
the Act is to the same effect.

The appellant quotes from the

Court's statement in Utah Copper Company v. Industrial Commiss•

----:.:.·

193 P. 24 (Utah 1920) wherein the Court also explains that
benefits were intended in cases of death for dependents only,
a Commission was created primarily to enable
injured employees, or dependents of such emhloyees
when death ensues to obtain such relief wit out
delay and without having to resort to the
uncertainties and expenses of litigation. (emphasis
added)
The very question raised by the appellant was the subject
of a decision by this Court in the case of Henrie v. Rocky
Mountain Packing Corporation, 113 U 415, 196
rehearing denied, 113 U. 444, 202 P.2d 727.

P.2d 487 (19481
That action was

brought by a non-dependent father who was denied death benefi:•i
the Industrial Commission and sued his son's employer for
wrongful death.

Explaining the purpose of the compensation

scheme in death cases, Justice Wolfe observed that
The intention of the Acts, then was to secure
workmen and their de~endents (not heirs or
personal representatives) against becoming objects
of charity, by making reasonable compensation for
calamities incidental to the employment and to
make human wastage in industry part of the cost
of production.
(Emphasis Original)
Henrie, supra, 196 P.2d at 493.
The denial of benefits to the appellant and the payment
of benefits to the Special Fund is in no way inconsistent
with the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The Act compensates those who were dependent in fact
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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..

on the decedent for support for actual financial losses just
as in all its other provisions the Act attempts to compensate
actual pecuniary losses.

Non-dependent survivors are not

persons whom the benefits of Workmen's Compensation were
intended to reach and an award of benefits to a non-dependent
would contradict the whole purpose and scheme fo the Act.

And,

as the appellant has been denied nothing to which she is
entitled, she has no standing to complain that the legislature
chose to finance the Special Fund by requiring payments to it
where no dependents

survive a deceased worker.

The appellant contends, additionaly, that since Article 1
Section 5 of the Constitution prohibits abrogation of the right
to bring an action for wrongful death, "except where compensation
for injuries resulting in death is provided for by law,"
she is entitled to death benefits or to an independent
action for wrongful death against her son's employer.
The question whether the Commission's order denying the
appellant death benefits bars an action against the defendant
employer for wrongful death is not properly before the Court.

It

is axiomatic that on appeal from an order of the Industrial
Commission this Court acquires jurisdiction solely to determine
the lawfulness of the Commission's order, Section 35-1-84, Utah
Code Annotated, and its collateral effect can only be determined
in another forum.

The appellant apparently suggests, however,

that the constitutional provision referred to in some way affects
the validity of the Commission's denial of benefits to her and
alternative award to the Special Fund.
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This issue was directly presented in the case of Henrie

-----=-::.__:_:

Rocky Mountain Packing Corporation, supra, discussed above.
noted, an action for wrongful death against his son's

employ~

was brought by a non-dependent father who was denied benefits:
the Commission.

The defendant employer contended that the

action was barred by his payment of benefits to the Commission
and payment of the decedent's burial expenses.

The plaintiff

argued, as does the appellant in the instant action, that
Article XVI Section 5 of the Utah Constitution prohibited
abrogation of his right to sue for wrongful death where he
had been denied death benefits, and that he was entitled to
benefits in one forum or the other.
The Court in Henrie agreed with the defendant employer
that the action was barred and construed the limiting

provisio~

Article 1 Section 5, "except where compensation for injuries

i::

is provided for by law," to mean that a right of action
against an employer for wrongful death can be barred by the
legislature whenever the death is one which subjects the
employer to the compensation obligations of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.

In other words, the legislature is empowerec

to substitute the compensation scheme as a whole for the
common law action for wrongful death against an employer.
Given that power, the legislature is at liberty within the
compensation system to deny death benefits to non-dependents

3' 1

I

it did by Section 35-1-73 while barring the non-dependent fro:;
bringing an action for wrongful death as it did by Section

id

without infringing on the non-dependent's constitutional riF
by either limitation.

The payment by the employer of buria:
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expenses and benefits to the state treasury pursuant to the
requirements of the Act is the providing of compensation which
brings the case within the exception to Article XVI Section 5,
as Justice Wolfe explained, even though neither payment directly
benefits the non-dependent survivor.
Plaintiff contends that because the money
paid by defendant or its insurance carrier into
the state treasury did not benefit him, it was not
compensation within the meaning of Article XVI,
Section 5 of the Constitution. Viewed in the light
of the history of that section of the Constitution
and of the Workmen's Compensation legislation, the
contention is untenable.
The amendment to the
Constitution was not designed or intended to preserve
all of the rights formerly guaranteed, and also
to create new rights.
On the contrary its very
purpose was to abrogate some of the rights
formerly held by persons entitled to sue under
the wrongful death statute.
"Compensation", as
used in the amendment to the Constitution, means
the same as it is used and defined in the compensation
act, i.e. any payment required by the act to be made to a
workman or to his dependents, or for their benefit,
or into the state treasury for the special purposes
of the compensation act.
This includes disability
payments, death benefits, medical and hospitalization
expenses, burial expenses, and payments into the
state treasury as provided by the act. Compensation
does not connote or require payment to, or for
the direct benefit of a non-dependent parent, who
would have been able to maintain an action for
wrongful death prior to the amendment to the state
Constitution. The payment of part of decedent's
burial expenses and of $1,000 in the state treasury
in accordance with the order of the Industrial
Commission, and as provided by statute, was payment
of "compensation" within the meaning of Article XVI,
Section 5, of the Constitution. Plaintiff has
no constitutional or statutory right to maintain
this action.
Henrie, supra, 196 P.2d at 493.
In summary, there is no merit to the appellant's contention
that the Commission's order violates the spirit and purpose

of the compensation Act.

Its purpose is to compensate
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workers and their dependents for actual financial losses
and the CollUllission found that the appellant has sustained no
compensable financial loss as a result of her son's death.
Likewise, there is no merit to her contention that Article xv:
Section 5 guarantees her compensation benefits or a right
of action against the employer for damages as this Court
I

has ruled that the provision allows the legislature to substitu·
I

the payment of compensation benefits for the wrongful death
action against the employer even where the compensation
benefits do not directly benefit the survivors.
CONCLUSION
The appellant and her family were not dependents of the
decedent because their own income was sufficient to maintain
in their accustomed style of life.

t~.E

The decedent's contributior.'

were not needed for his family's support and represented paymc
of his own living expenses.

The appellant's testimony provides

a substantial basis for the CollUllission' s finding and there is
no contrary evidence in the record which would justify a
reversal of the order entered.
A denial of benefits to a non-dependent does not violate
the purpose of the Act but is, in fact, mandated by the theory
of Workmen's Compensation.

The statutory manner of supportin~

of the Special Fund by payments from employers in cases of dea:
where no dependents survive does not affect the appellant's r;:"
and is a reasonable exercise of legislative discretion.
The appellant's right to bring a wrongful death action
against the decedent's employer is not in issue on this arpe 5
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35

it can only be tested by the collateral action itself.

However, this Court has ruled that Atricle XVI, Section 5 of
the Utah Constitution allows the Workmen's Compensation Act
to be substituted for a wrongful death action against an
employer and that non-dependents are deprived of no constitutional
right by their statutory ineligibility for death benefits.
Respectfully submitted this

day of September, 1979.

BLACK & MOORE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE INSURANCE FUND were mailed
to Frank V. Nelson, Assistant Attorney General, State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and to Peter N. Vlahos,
2447 Kiessel Ave., Ogden, Utah 84401, postage prepaid this
day of September, 1979.
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